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Abstract
We argue that prejudice should be investigated in the context of social-cognitive development and the interplay between morality
and group identity. Our new perspective examines how children consider group identity (and group norms) along with their
developing moral beliefs about fairness and justice. This is achieved by developing an integrated framework drawing on develop-
mental and social psychological theories of prejudice. This synthesis results in a perspective that provides a more contextualized
analysis of prejudice development than that previously offered by developmental theories. We describe research that supports
our view that social norms, intergroup contact, and perceived outgroup threat affect the relative weight children place on moral
and group-based criteria during the development of prejudice.
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Psychological science has studied prejudice since the 1920s
and 1930s (see Brown, 1995; Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman,
2005). On the positive side, psychological research on adults
has shown that explicit racial prejudice has declined in the last
decades of the 20th century (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998);
moreover, there is extensive evidence for the pervasive lifelong
valuing of equality of persons and moral principles among
humans (see Killen & Smetana, 2006). On the negative side,
explicit prejudice against other groups still remains high in the
21st century (e.g., Muslims in the U.S. and Europe), and impli-
cit biases against members of outgroups remain pervasive in
most regions of the world (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995)
What about children? Do they show prejudice, and, if so,
why? Prior research has demonstrated that, on the one hand,
children display ethnic bias and prejudice in interethnic con-
texts (e.g., McGlothlin & Killen, 2006; Rutland, Cameron,
Milne, & McGeorge, 2005), and on the other hand, evaluate
racial and ethnic exclusion from groups as unfair—that is,
morally wrong (Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor,
2002). In this article, we will address this apparent contradic-
tion by proposing a new social-cognitive developmental
perspective on children’s prejudice. This proposes that the
dynamic between developing morality and group identity
reflects the crux of prejudice as it emerges in childhood, and
that group membership becomes an important source of
influence on children’s ability and motivation to enact their
emerging beliefs about fairness, inclusion, and equality.
Our intention is to map out a new social-cognitive develop-
mental perspective on prejudice that will provide a framework
for future research. In the first section of this article, we intro-
duce our domain-specific social-cognitive developmental
approach, which shares a contextual foundation many contem-
porary theories in developmental science, and we demonstrate
how it differs from a domain-general cognitive developmental
model. Following this theoretical critique, we outline our inte-
grative social-cognitive developmental perspective on preju-
dice, which addresses the relationships between morality and
group identity. We contend that prejudice development
involves a close interplay between the emergence of moral rea-
soning, concerns about group functioning, and the motivation
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to become fully integrated into a social group. Children have to
weigh their concerns about group identity (i.e., preserving
group norms) with their developing moral beliefs about fair-
ness and justice.
For example, all-boy private schools are often asked to
include girls, but some boys balk at the idea and cite the need
to preserve the group and maintain ‘‘group order,’’ as the idea is
seen as disruptive and unconventional. In contrast, other boys
challenge the underlying set of stereotypes behind the argu-
ment and advocate gender-integrated schools based on the
moral principles of fairness and equality. In this article, we are
concerned with whether (and when) children consider both
their group identity (i.e., the need to be valued by the group)
and morality (i.e., the need to act according to moral principles)
when affirming or rejecting prejudiced attitudes.
Our perspective uniquely draws from two compatible
theories within developmental and social psychology: social
domain theory (Turiel, 1998) and social identity theory (SIT;
Tajfel & Turner, 1986), respectively. Therefore, the next sec-
tions of this article briefly describe each theory and their
related research, including recent research on social reasoning
from a social domain viewpoint (Killen, Margie, & Sinno,
2006) and developmental subjective group dynamics from a
social identity perspective (Abrams & Rutland, 2008). Next,
we review recent research on how children simultaneously
consider both morality and group identity when evaluating
intergroup exclusion. Finally, we describe research that has
examined the factors that we propose are related to the rela-
tive weight children place on morality and group identity in
the formation of their attitudes toward groups and individuals
within groups, and we provide three new areas for future
research.




Developmental research from the 1970s onward has often exam-
ined prejudice from a domain-general cognitive developmental
perspective. This approach theorizes that children’s limited cog-
nitive abilities—in the form of an inability to weigh multiple
classifications simultaneously, such as those involved in the
logical classification of objects—at least in part account for pre-
judice and stereotyping amongst children (Aboud, 2008; Bigler
& Liben, 2006). The argument goes that as children became
capable of weighing two or more categories simultaneously
(e.g., concrete operations in Piaget’s theory by age 7 or 8), chil-
dren understand that multiple categories could be assigned to the
same person (e.g., French, nice, friendly, likes books, shy) and,
therefore, focus on a single category (e.g., French or ‘‘foreign’’)
declines, with age making prejudice less likely. For example,
instead of viewing another child merely as ‘‘foreign,’’ that child
may be viewed as a person who has brown hair, is quite tall,
good at sport, and friendly.
Recently researchers have pointed to limitations of the
cognitive developmental perspective on prejudice (Nesdale,
2008; Rutland, 2004). First, research shows that other forms
of prejudice do not decline with age; rather, they are more
dependent on the social experience and social attributions of
intentions (e.g., McGlothlin & Killen, 2005, 2006). McGlothlin
and colleagues used ambiguous situations to determine whether
children used race to attribute intentions when evaluating
familiar, everyday peer encounters. They showed that 6–9 year
old European American children attributed more negative
intentions to a Black child than to a White child in potential
‘‘pushing’’ and ‘‘stealing’’ ambiguous peer encounters on the
playground. They also rated a Black child’s next action and
friendship potential more negatively than that of a White child.
Although these findings initially appeared to reflect a pervasive
racial bias, there was an important qualification. This bias was
only revealed by European-American children in racially non-
mixed schools; European-American children of the same age in
the same school district and enrolled in ethnically mixed
schools did not attribute more positive intentions to their
ingroup than to the outgroup; in fact, race was not used to attri-
bute negative intentions.
Moreover, research shows that both implicit and explicit
prejudice continues after childhood, through adolescence and
into adulthood. Using the Implicit Associations Test (IAT),
researchers have shown that European-American adults hold
implicit racial biases of which they are not aware (e.g.,
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). These adults more
quickly associate negative words with outgroup (Black) faces
than with ingroup (White) faces. Recent developmental studies
have also examined implicit bias in childhood using IAT type
methodologies (Baron & Banaji, 2006; Rutland, Cameron,
Milne, & McGeorge, 2005). For example Rutland, Cameron,
Milne, and McGeorge (2005) used a child-friendly pictorial-
based IATand found implicit racial and national biaseswere pres-
ent amongst White British children aged 6 to 16 years. This child
version of the IAT measured the relative strength of association
between concepts (e.g., ‘‘White British’’ or ‘‘BlackBritish’’ faces)
and attributes (e.g., ‘‘happy’’ or ‘‘sad’’ cartoon faces). Implicit bias
was measured by whether children showed faster reaction times
for stereotypical (e.g., ‘‘White British’’ and ‘‘happy’’) than coun-
terstereotypical (e.g., ‘‘Black British’’ and ‘‘happy’’) associations.
Moreover, implicit racial biases remain in older children even
though they show the usual pattern of reduced explicit racial bias.
Further, somewhat contrary to the cognitive-developmental
perspective, research has shown that explicit prejudice and
stereotypes persist in both adolescence and adulthood. For
example, European-American adolescents enrolled in ethni-
cally homogeneous schools were more likely to use explicit
stereotypes to explain racial discomfort in peer encounters than
were European-American adolescents enrolled in ethnically
heterogeneous schools (Killen, Kelly, Richardson, Crystal, &
Ruck, in press). In addition, extensive research has demon-
strated the existence of racial and gender stereotyping in adult-
hood (see for examples, Abrams, Hogg, & Marques, 2005;
Dovidio et al., 2005; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001).
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Fourth, the domain-general cognitive-developmental
perspective contends that prejudice development follows a
general age-related pattern (i.e., it emerges in the preschool
years, peaks around 7–8 years of age, and then declines). Up
until the late 1980s, such a focus on domain-general age trends,
characterized as ‘‘stages of development,’’ was also proposed
in other areas of developmental science, such as morality
(Kohlberg, 1984), social perspective-taking (Selman, 1980),
and logical reasoning (Piaget, 1952). The notion was that
children use one global scheme to evaluate a range of situations
in many different contexts (e.g., if they have a ‘‘selfish,
punishment-avoidant’’ orientation, then this type of thinking
pervades their way of evaluating problems across a number
of tasks). However, in recent years, a focus on global stages
as a framework for understanding children’s cognitive and
social-cognitive development has greatly diminished with
the increase of evidence supporting domain specificity in
children’s knowledge and development.
Domain-Specific Approach
In general, domain-specific models of cognition have replaced
domain-general theories as the most parsimonious interpreta-
tion of children’s developing cognitive abilities (see Keil,
2006). Beginning in the late 1980s, empirical studies in the area
of social-cognitive development research have provided a basis
for characterizing development in terms of social domains,
as reflected in research on social and moral development
(Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2006). From an early age (3–4 years
of age), social-cognitive domain approaches demonstrate that
children’s judgments reflect distinctive reasoning process
that simultaneously reflect considerations about the self
(i.e., psychological domain, including autonomy; personal
prerogatives), the group (societal domain, reflecting customs,
traditions, regulations designed to promote the smooth func-
tioning of groups), and morality (i.e., moral domain, reflecting
principles of fairness, equality, rights and others’ welfare).
These domains exist in parallel in early development. This
means that young children are capable of using different forms
of reasoning (not just one form) at the same time, such as
weighing moral considerations, group norms, and personal
goals.
How children’s behavior reflects multiple considerations
simultaneously (e.g., an issue of fairness and convention) or the
way they use different forms of reasoning (e.g., moral and psy-
chological) to evaluate situations and to act on their judgments
is a focus of the research paradigm. This research model, then,
focuses on the different reasons children use for evaluating
issues in a range of social situations and the contextual para-
meters that make an issue reflect psychological, societal, or
moral considerations. This model, which has been applied to
understanding a range of children’s and adolescent’s social
concepts, provides the basis for the integrative approach put
forward in this article.
In the next section, we will discuss how a domain-specific
approach drawing upon theories within developmental and
social psychology provides the basis for a new perspective on
the development of prejudice.
An Integrative Social-Cognitive
Developmental Perspective on Prejudice
Our social reasoning developmental (SRD) perspective
addresses the apparent contradiction between the early onset
of both prejudice and morality in childhood by showing that
children simultaneously develop the ability to think about the
social world using different types of judgments, while consid-
ering notions of group identity, social-conventional norms, and
morality. This complex social reasoning then forms the basis
for their evaluations of groups and peers within groups. The
SRD perspective originates from an integration of traditions
within both developmental psychology and social domain the-
ory (Turiel, 1983) and social psychology and SIT (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986). In synthesizing these theories into a perspective,
we argue that the interplay between morality and group identity
is central to the emergence of prejudice in childhood and that
both elements need to be considered in conjunction within
future research.
Psychologists have long considered the relationship
between morality and group processes (i.e., norms, conven-
tions). Kohlberg (1971) and Piaget (1932) both defined moral-
ity as distinct from group phenomena such as cultural norms
and customs in the development of their domain-general stage
models of morality. Moreover, morality is defined as principles
or norms that are independent and autonomous from group con-
ventions given the generalizable nature of justice, fairness, and
equality, for example. These models, such as Kohlberg’s
(1971) conceived principled morality as postconventional
(i.e., independent from culture and developmentally later than
social-conventional reasoning). In contrast, others have argued
that the source of all morality lies in the group (culture or sub-
culture). For example, moral judgments have been defined as
‘‘evaluations (good or bad) of the actions or character of a
person that are made with respect of a set of virtues held to
be obligatory by a culture or subculture’’ (Haidt, 2001, p. 817).
Our perspective does not take a morally relativistic position
or define morality as what the culture deems is right or wrong
(consistent with over 100 empirical studies; see Smetana,
2006). Instead we contend that children’s decision making is
influenced simultaneously by both morality (principles distinct
from cultural norms) and group processes (norms and identity),
as these two processes are intertwined in development.
Research described below clearly shows that, starting in middle
childhood, children infer group loyalty norms and use both
moral and social-conventional forms of reasoning when differ-
entiating within and between social groups. We draw on social
psychological theories to investigate social reasoning involving
group identity (and group loyalty) and social developmental
theories to assess social reasoning concerned with morality and
social conventions. How these factors contribute to the emer-
gence of prejudice and discrimination in childhood is a main
goal of our new research paradigm.
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Ours is not the first model to integrate theories from
developmental and social psychology. For example, Bigler and
Liben’s (2006, 2007) developmental intergroup theory is
grounded in the cognitive-developmental theory described
above and SIT. What makes our approach different is that we
draw on social-cognitive domain theory, rather than the
domain-general cognitive-developmental theory; social-cogni-
tive domain theory makes fundamentally different assumptions
about development, cognition, and the acquisition of social
concepts than does cognitive-developmental theory, as dis-
cussed above. In line with SIT, we also argue that knowing that
you belong to a social group is related to the expression of pre-
judice and that relationships between social groups within any
context are important in making certain social group member-
ships salient.
In concert with social domain theory, social identity theor-
ists hold that judgments at different levels of categorization are
interconnected and that social perception follows a general
principle of maximizing the meaningful fit of information to
the task and situation at hand (see Abrams & Hogg, 1999). Our
integrated model is one that reflects compatibility at the meta-
theoretical level. We assert that integration between SIT and
social domain theory is appropriate and fruitful given that these
theories are complementary. In the following sections, we
describe both social domain and social identity theories of chil-
dren’s prejudice to demonstrate how these two approaches are
compatible and together help provide a new integrative per-
spective on prejudice development.
Social Domain Theory and Children’s
Prejudice
Social domain theory has informed research on prejudice in
childhood by demonstrating the forms of social reasoning that
children use when evaluating situations that reflect social
exclusion: the moral, social conventional, and the psychologi-
cal (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983). For example, exclusion may
be viewed as wrong and unfair (moral), or as legitimate to make
the group work well (conventional), or as legitimate due to per-
sonal prerogatives and choice (psychological). Research using
the social domain approach has shown that exclusion (i.e., bla-
tant prejudice) based solely on gender and race, which involves
the use of negative stereotypes, is viewed as wrong and unfair
by the vast majority of children and adolescents interviewed
and surveyed. At the other end of the spectrum, there are forms
of exclusion that are tolerated by children—for example, exclu-
sion based on qualifications (e.g., excluding a slow runner from
a track team) or exclusion based on agreed group criteria (e.g.,
excluding somebody from a music club who cannot play
music). What we are interested in are the types of exclusion
that are multifaceted and at times ambiguous, involving both
group identity and issues of fairness, due to the potential use
of factors that result in prejudicial and biased outcomes. These
forms of exclusion often involve subtle forms of ingroup favor-
itism, prejudice, and stereotyping.
In a series of studies, Killen and colleagues (Crystal, Killen,
& Ruck, 2008; Killen, Pisacane, Lee-Kim, & Ardila-Rey,
2001; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Theimer, Killen, & Stangor,
2001) assessed children’s evaluations of peer exclusion in
everyday contexts, such as activities (doll playing, truck play-
ing) and peer clubs (baseball, ballet), as well as common peer
encounters (lunch time, afterschool clubs, birthday parties,
dating).
These studies demonstrated that, from a young age, children
in straightforward situations give priority to moral reasoning
instead of group membership by emphasizing moral reasoning
(e.g., fairness) when judging exclusion based on group mem-
bership, such as gender or race (‘‘It’s unfair to not let the girl
play with trucks; she can play with them, too, and she probably
has them at home’’). Yet, by investigating whether complexity
or ambiguity reveals prejudice or bias, studies from this
approach found that young children often resorted to stereoty-
pic judgments or conventions to justify exclusion (see Fig. 1;
Killen et al., 2001). For example, when deciding whom to
include in a club when there is only room for one more to join
(and two peers from different groups want to join), children
often justified inclusion on the basis of group functioning
and/or stereotypic expectations (‘‘It’s okay to not let the girl
join because girls don’t like trucks and they might cry’’; Killen
et al., 2001), confirming and extending previous findings with
adults, in which stereotypes have been shown to be invoked
more often in situations involving ambiguity or complexity
than in straightforward contexts (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2006).
In a study with older children between 6 and 13 years of age
(Killen & Stangor, 2001), age-related changes indicated that, in
a straightforward context, the majority of children rejected
decisions to exclude on the basis of gender or and race (see
Fig. 2), and used moral reasons (see Fig. 3). For example, the
children typically said, ‘‘It’s unfair not to let the girl in the
baseball club; many girls play baseball and can be really
good.’’ In contrast, when asked to make decisions about
exclusion in complex situations in which the threat to group
functioning was increased, older children rejected the
























Figure 1. Proportion of moral and conventional reasons used
by children (4.5 years) in straightforward and complex gender
exclusion contexts.
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conventional reasons (see Fig. 3). For example, older children
typically said ‘‘The group won’t work well with someone
different in it; they will feel strange if a boy joins the team and
he just won’t fit in.’’ Moreover, various studies have shown that
identification with the excluder is related to the types of reasons
used to justify exclusion: Boys may view exclusion of a girl
from a boys’ group as legitimate based on group conventions
and identity (Killen et al., 2002), and ethnic minority students
in the United States. are more likely to evaluate interracial
exclusion by ethnic majority students (e.g., not having lunch
with a friend of a different race) as more wrong than would the
ethnic majority students themselves, and they would use moral
reasoning to explain their judgments.
The form of reasoning used by children varies depending on
the contextual parameters (Horn, 2008; Killen, 2007). Research
using the social domain model has demonstrated that contex-
tual variables (other than ‘‘straightforward’’ or ‘‘complex’’
dimensions) contribute to the use of different forms of reason-
ing. Children and adolescents evaluate intergroup exclusion
differently and use different forms of reasoning as a function
of the source of influence (parents or peers), the level of inti-
macy (friendship, dating, marriage), individuating information
(qualifications for joining a group), and status of the groups,
whether the context is private or public (friendship, peer clubs,
societal institutions).
For example, with age, children reject parental statements
condoning intergroup exclusion (Killen et al., 2002), view
intergroup exclusion as more of a matter of personal choice
than morality in intimate contexts (Edmonds & Killen, 2009;
Killen, Henning, Kelly, Crystal, & Ruck, 2007; Killen,
Stangor, Horn, & Sechrist, 2004), and are less likely to use
stereotypes when individuating information is available.
Further, with age, adolescents use moral reasoning to reject
parental norms when exclusion is condoned by parents,
whereas they will use social conventional reasoning to assert
that exclusion is legitimate when it is condoned by peers, espe-
cially when exclusion is important to preserve group function-
ing (Horn, 2008).
This body of research, then, has demonstrated the range of
contextual variables that contribute to the manifestation of pre-
judiced attitudes, by illustrating how these attitudes develop past
early childhood and by demonstrating the forms of judgments
and reasons that children and adolescents use to justify inter-
group exclusion are dependent upon the extent to which they
identify with a group (e.g., boys or peer group). A key finding
from this recent research using a social domain approach is that
group identity becomes a powerful and salient dimension when
evaluating the legitimacy of exclusion in group contexts.
SIT and Children’s Prejudice
To understand better how group identity might impact
children’s prejudiced judgments, developmental psycholo-
gists have drawn from theories in social psychology. In par-
ticular the focus has been on SIT, which argues that group
memberships form an integral part of the self-concept. They
are foundational for becoming a person and necessary for
psychological well-being and the effective functioning of
society. Likewise, social domain theory argues that
conventions and traditions are perpetuated from one



























Figure 2. Proportion of children (6, 9, and 13 years of
age) rejecting stereotypes when choosing a peer to join a
























Figure 3. Proportion of children (6, 9, and 13 years) using
moral or social-conventional reasons for rejecting stereotypes
when choosing a peer to join a club.
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recreating strong group identities that ensure successful
adaptation and attachment to others.
It is important to note that SIT contends that self-evaluation
in a particular context partly depends on which specific group
identity is salient. Identification with different groups and cate-
gories can vary over time and situation because it is highly
responsive to changes in the social context (see Rutland &
Cinnirella, 2000). Nonetheless, SIT contends that individuals
are typically motivated to sustain a positive social identity
given its importance to the self. This is achieved by establish-
ing that ingroups are positive and distinctive relative to com-
parison groups or to outgroups who are judged negatively. The
‘‘self-esteem hypothesis’’ assumes this prejudice is motivated
either to gain or to restore self-esteem. This idea has not been
without critics, and an additional motivation—establishing
coherence andmeaning for the self—has also emerged as a strong
contender (Abrams&Hogg,2001).Theoverall point, however, is
that the development of group identity requires children to inter-
pret and give meaning to their context, and this often, though not
always, involves the construction of differentiation between
social categories (i.e., intergroup bias).
SIT contends that group identities often generate intergroup
biases as well as a motivation to maintain group norms and group
functioning (Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Abrams, Rutland, &
Cameron, 2003;Verkuyten, 2002).Recent researchdrawingonSIT
suggests that with age, children show advanced understanding of
how groups function (Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier, & Ferrell,
2009) and begin to experience group pressures to conform to stereo-
typic expectations and norms (Nesdale, Durkin,Maass,&Griffiths,
2005a; Rutland, 2004; Rutland, Cameron, Milne, & McGeorge,
2005). This process, especially in competitive intergroup contexts,
often results in the emergence of negative attitudes to outgroups or
at least preference for the ingroup over the outgroup.
Research supporting SIT has shown that prejudice tends
to be elevated to the extent that children and adults identify
(i.e., both in terms of self-categorization and feeling an
emotional attachment) with their ingroup. For example, recent
developmental studies have shown that increased ingroup iden-
tification amongst children is related to stronger intergroup
biases (Bennett, Lyons, Sani, & Barrett, 1998; Pfeifer et al.,
2007; Verkuyten, 2001) and to the exclusion of peers within
groups (Abrams et al., 2003). For example, Pfeifer and col-
leagues (2007) found intergroup bias was strongest amongst eth-
nic minority children who identified more with their ethnic than
their national (i.e., American) ingroup. In contrast, research has
shown that the development of a common inclusive social iden-
tity (e.g., school or family) rather than a singular exclusive social
identity (e.g., Cameron, Rutland, Brown, & Douch, 2006) and
development of a secure (i.e., well developed and assured) ethnic
identity (Phinney, Cantu, & Kurtz, 1997) reduce intergroup bias
among children and adolescents.
Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics
Overall, research drawing on SIT shows that group
identification is related to the development of children’s
attitudes to their ingroup and other groups. An extension of SIT
that considers not just intergroup attitudes but also children’s
judgment of individuals within groups (i.e., intragroup atti-
tudes) is the developmental subjective group dynamics model
(Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Abrams et al., 2003; Abrams,
Rutland, Cameron, & Ferrell, 2007; Abrams et al., 2009),
which holds that children develop a dynamic relationship
between their judgments about peers within groups (i.e.,
intragroup attitudes) and about groups as a whole (i.e., inter-
group attitudes).
As children’s social-cognitive ability develops and they
experience belonging to more social groups, they are more
likely to integrate their preferences for different groups, with
their evaluations of peers within groups based on particular
characteristics or behaviors (Abrams & Rutland, 2008). For
example, a group of children identifying with a sports team
may begin to change their attitudes about a member of the
ingroup ‘‘team’’ who acts like or prefers members of a rival
team (the outgroup). This change in children’s social cognition
means they can often both exclude a peer because they are from
a different social group (i.e., intergroup bias) and exclude a
peer from within their group (i.e., intragroup bias) who deviates
from the group’s social-conventional norms, such as increased
liking of an outgroup member.
Research following this developmental intergroup approach
has investigated intergroup and intragroup attitudes alongside
the construction of an experimental paradigm to examine how
children evaluate ingroup and outgroup peers who either
showed normative (loyal) behavior or deviant (disloyal) beha-
vior. In experiments children were first asked to rate how they
felt toward the ingroup as a whole and the outgroup as a whole
(i.e., intergroup attitude). Then the children heard descriptions
of normative and deviant peers who were either in the same or
different group. Normative peers made two positive statements
about the group, whereas deviant peers made one positive state-
ment about the group, but also one positive statement about the
other group.
Studies in intergroup contexts that used national groups
(Abrams et al., 2003), summer school groups (Abrams et al.,
2007), and minimal or ‘‘arbitrary’’ groups (Abrams, Rutland,
Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2008) have all shown that, when evaluating
individuals from different groups, children simultaneously pre-
fer those from other social groups and those within their peer
group that do not threaten the social conventional norm central
to their group (i.e., loyalty). In addition, studies have shown
that children’s understanding of how other group members will
respond to deviance and their own evaluations of peers are
more strongly linked among older children that are more moti-
vated to support their ingroup (i.e., show high intergroup bias
or identify more strongly within their ingroup; e.g., Abrams
et al., 2008). These findings indicate that both intragroup and
intergroup attitudes are related to the children’s sense of social
identity and their desire to differentiate between groups. In
some cases, the desire to maintain social identity results in pre-
judice, bias, and discrimination. This is because the outcome of
preserving the ingroup is rejecting the outgroup. This desire to
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preserve the ingroup, however, does not necessarily result in
outgroup negativity (Brewer, 1999). An integrative social rea-
soning domain model provides a way to differentiate these dif-
ferent outcomes.
Thus, social domain and social identity approaches are com-
plementary viewpoints on how prejudice emerges in childhood
and on the changes that take place from childhood to adult-
hood. Social domain theory provides a way to investigate moral
reasoning about fairness and equality as well as social conven-
tional reasoning about groups, which reflect how individuals
interpret, categorize, and attribute meaning to social situations,
events, and relationships. SIT addresses the processes that
make one group identity more salient than another and how
intragroup and intergroup dynamics contribute to prejudice and
bias. Both theories provide ways to investigate how individuals
conceptualize groups and when group identity is given priority
(and why) in contrast to when moral principles (e.g., fairness or
equality) are given priority, particularly in intergroup contexts
involving prejudiced attitudes and behavior. In the next section,
we describe recent research showing that children simultane-
ously consider group identity and morality when developing
their judgments of groups and individuals within groups.
Research on Morality and Group Identity
The dynamic relationship between morality and group identity
was examined directly in a recent developmental study on age-
related increases in children’s judgments of peers within
groups. This study showed that older children excluded peers
who challenged their own group norms (Abrams & Rutland,
2008; Abrams et al., 2008). However, in contrast with previous
research based on the developmental subjective group
dynamics model, the study considered how deviance from an
individual that threatens the group may arise not in the
social-conventional domain, but in the moral domain. The
focus was on how children weigh their concerns about group
identity (i.e., maintaining the group norms) with moral beliefs
about fairness and justice. Which aspect of the situation do
children consider most important, the favorability of peers who
preserve the group norms (i.e., the individual who supports
their group) or their knowledge about the basis for exclusion
(i.e., whether the act is unfair)?
Abrams and colleagues (2008) conducted this study using
the paradigm familiar to developmental subjective group
dynamics research but with the addition of a moral norm varia-
tion (drawn from the social-cognitive domain model). They
investigated how children judged peers in minimal groups
whose behavior was loyal or disloyal (Study 1) and morally
acceptable or unacceptable (Study 2). Consistent with the pre-
vious research (Abrams et al., 2007), Abrams et al. found that,
in Study 1, children used their understanding of loyalty norms
as a basis for their own evaluations of peers. In addition, higher
commitment to the ingroup increased children’s use of group
based criteria for judging peers. Study 2 is most relevant
here as it analyzed how children employ both moral and
group-based criteria when evaluating ingroup and outgroup
peers that deviate according to moral principles.
In Study 2, 5–7 year-old (i.e., younger) and 10–11 year-old
(i.e., older) children were asked to judge peers from a minimal
ingroup and outgroup who either adhered to (i.e., normative) or
transgressed (i.e., deviant)moral principles. Theywere also asked
howothers from their ingroup and theoutgroupwould judge these
peers.Abrams and colleagues used fairness as themoral principle.
For example, an unfair peer was described as someone who
‘‘doesn’t take turns and pushes people to get ahead in the queue’’
orwas someonewho ‘‘is very selfishwith toys and games.’’ It was
found that older children had a better understanding of whether
groups would exclude or include different peers (i.e., differential
inclusion) and were willing to exclude peers themselves on the
basis of the peer’s group membership (i.e., group based bias).
At the same time, however, older children also invoked principles
of morality (e.g., behaving according to the fairness principle)
when making exclusion decisions. Thus, children favored
ingroup members over outgroup members but also favored peers
from either group who behaved according to a moral principle
over morally deviant individuals from each group.
In addition, when considering group-based judgments, the
results from Study 2 also showed that children’s understanding
of how other group members will respond to deviance (i.e., dif-
ferential inclusion) and their own evaluations of peers (i.e.,
group-based evaluations or bias) were more strongly linked the
more the children identified with the their ingroup. As shown in
Figure 4, analysis of simple slopes showed that the relationship
between inclusion and bias was only marginally significant
when identification was low but is larger and highly significant
when identification was high. In contrast, with moral-based
judgments, children who believed their peers would more
strongly favor fair over unfair members made similar judg-
ments themselves. Most important, their judgments were not
affected by how strongly they identified with the group or their
beliefs about how peers judge ingroup and outgroup members.
The more strongly children identified with the ingroup, the
more closely related were their judgments of group-based (but
not moral-based) inclusion and their own group-based (but not
moral-based) differential bias toward members. These findings
suggest that children’s identity is only relevant to the group-
based domain of differentiation within groups.
Thus, it does not appear that children’s responses to ingroup
and outgroup peers require a tradeoff between favoring peers
because of their group membership or favoring them because
of their morality. Instead, Abrams and colleagues (2008)
showed that when moral breaches are objectively uncorrelated
with group membership, children use both morality and group
memberships as independent bases of judgment. This study
supports our perspective by showing that morality and group-
based judgments are not opposites. Rather, children employ
both when engaging in peer rejection (see also Killen, Rutland,
& Jampol, 2008).
Other recent studies have investigated how children
coordinate moral concerns of fairness with group identity. For
example, in a study on exclusion from social cliques, Horn
Social-Cognitive Perspective on Prejudice 285
285 by Adam Rutland on May 20, 2010pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
(2006) showed that both social identity and group status influ-
ence adolescents’ judgments about inclusion and exclusion of
adolescent cliques. This study found that adolescents who
identified themselves as members of high-status groups
(cheerleaders, jocks) exhibited more ingroup bias in their
exclusion decisions, were more likely to use conventional
rather than moral reasoning in justifying their judgments, and
were more likely to invoke stereotypes than were adolescents
who identified as members of low-status groups.
Further, Horn (2003) has shown that the majority of adoles-
cents viewed exclusion from a valued resource, such as a scho-
larship, as morally wrong (e.g., it would be wrong to deny a
‘‘jock’’ the chance of an academic scholarship). In contrast,
their stereotypes about groups did significantly influence their
evaluation of exclusion from group participation (e.g., it is all
right to exclude a ‘‘gothic’’ from joining the cheerleaders).
Here, the adolescents were more likely to condone acts of
exclusion when individuals did not fit the stereotypic expecta-
tions of the group and, therefore, challenged the functioning of
the group. These findings show that adolescents are more likely
to use stereotypes to condone exclusion when group-based
criteria are relevant (i.e., need to maintain group norms for
effective group functioning).
In addition, Verkuyten and Slooter (2008) demonstrated the
coexistence of different forms of reasoning regarding inter-
group exclusion between Dutch and Muslim adolescents. They
conducted an experimental questionnaire study with Muslim
minority and non-Muslim majority Dutch adolescents finding
that their reasoning about civic liberties and tolerance of others
was dependent on their group membership. For example,
Muslims were less tolerant of free speech by others when it
involved offending God and religion. In contrast, non-
Muslims were less tolerant of minority rights (e.g., the idea
of separate religious schools, the wearing of a headscarf, and
the right to burn the national flag in demonstrations). These
findings suggest that in the ‘‘hot’’ context of Muslim and
non-Muslim relations in Europe an adolescent’s group mem-
bership influence their social reasoning about moral issues and
level of tolerance toward others.
The research we have described above supports our perspec-
tive by showing that children can simultaneously consider
group identity, social-conventional norms, and morality when
forming their evaluations of groups and peers within groups.
Our perspective also contends there are specific variables that
affect the relative weight children place on moral and group-
based criteria in different intergroup contexts. First, we contend
that social norms promoting exclusion facilitate the use of
social-conventional group-based reasoning over morality and,
therefore, lead to differentiation within and between groups.
Second, our perspective argues that high levels of intergroup
contact promote the use of moral-based rather than group-
based conventional reasoning when children develop their atti-
tudes toward other social groups. Finally, our perspective also
suggests that a perceived outgroup threat encourages children
to base their exclusion judgments more on group membership
factors than on morality. Studies on social norms, intergroup
contact, and perceived outgroup threat have provided promis-
ing findings that support our perspective and will be briefly
described below.
Social Norms and Self-Presentation
First, research suggests that social norms that promote exclu-
sion also encourage group-based reasoning over morality and
contribute to children showing prejudice when evaluating
groups and peers within groups. Social norms prescribe cultural
expectations regarding attitudes, values, and behavior, which
have been well delineated by social domain theory (Smetana,
2006), as described above. Social conventional expectations
derive from specific peer groups or more widespread societal
conventions, traditions, and customs (Turiel, 1983). As chil-
dren become aware of conventional expectations, they make
explicit decisions regarding the extent to which they accept
or reject these norms. In some contexts, children strategically
present the self as acting in accordance with these norms, so
giving a positive impression of themselves to relevant and sig-
nificant others (Abrams & Brown, 1989; FitzRoy & Rutland, in
press; Rutland, 2004; Rutland et al., 2007; Rutland, Cameron,
Milne, & McGeorge, 2005).
Research on children, adolescents, and adults suggests that
the development of differentiation between individuals within
groups and between social groups involves an increase in
sensitivity to anticipated public audiences (Lambert, Payne,
Jacoby, Shaffer, & Chasteen, 2003) and the normative aspects
of the intergroup context (Abrams et al., 2007; Rutland,

















Low Group-Based Differential Inclusion
High Group-Based Differential Inclusion
Figure 4. Simple slopes showing the relationship between
differential inclusion and group-based evaluations as a function of
identification with the ingroup (Abrams et al., 2008; Study 2).
Simple slopes are depicted for values of group identification and
differential inclusion that are 1 SD above (high) and below (low)
their respective means.
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research with children suggests that increasing accountability
to their peer group, in the sense that their actions are visible and
thus can be criticized and may have to be defended, makes
social norms salient and promotes self-presentational judg-
ments (i.e., either increased or decreased exclusion within
groups and intergroup bias between groups).
For example Rutland, Cameron, Milne, and McGeorge
(2005; Study 1) found that 5–16 year-old White British chil-
dren who were highly aware of the social norm against expres-
sing explicit racism showed low explicit racial prejudice. In
contrast, children with little awareness of this norm only inhib-
ited their prejudice when the norm was made salient by increas-
ing their accountability (see Fig. 5). Typically, social norms
condemn explicit racism and subsequently self-presentation
results in the inhibition of ethnic prejudice. In contrast, pro-
prejudice norms regarding national outgroups have been found
before in studies with White European children in either the
United Kingdom (e.g., Abrams et al., 2003; Rutland, 1999)
or the Netherlands (Verkuyten, 2001). Therefore, unsurpris-
ingly, Rutland, Cameron, Milne, and McGeorge (2005; Study
2) found that 10–12 year-old White British children increased
their national intergroup bias when made accountable to their
national ingroup. A recent study by Abrams et al. (2007) also
showed that, within an ingroup versus outgroup school context,
children over 7 years of age were more likely to exclude peers
when they were made accountable to the ingroup. These studies
show that the self-presentation process can also operate to
facilitate prejudice in the domain of nationality and school
groups, whereas with ethnicity, children typically self-present
by inhibiting their prejudice. Similarly, Killen and colleagues
demonstrated that gender bias is reduced when an anti-
prejudice norm is introduced by peers (Killen et al., 2001).
They found that young children (ages 4 and 5 years) who made
stereotypic decisions in peer play contexts (excluding a girl
from playing with trucks) were more inclusive after hearing
anti-exclusion probes from peers (‘‘What if she likes trucks and
wants to play, too?’’); at the same time, children who made
fairness decisions were not more exclusive after hearing
pro-exclusion probes (‘‘What if trucks are for boys?’’).
Together these studies suggest that children who are able to
pick up on social norms about prejudice expression held by
their group (i.e., show advanced mental state understanding)
and have strong group identities are likely to vary their preju-
dice due to self-presentational concerns. According to our per-
spective, this process should lead to positive attitudes toward
outgroups, if moral principles like equality and fairness are
essential to the group identity. We suggest that although indi-
viduals are often motivated to boost their self-esteem or estab-
lish meaning for the self by differentiating between groups (i.e.,
intergroup bias), it is also possible that when individuals
identify with outgroups that support moral principles then
inclusivity may be more persuasive.
Intergroup Contact
Our perspective also suggests that intergroup contact (i.e.,
direct or indirect interaction between individuals from different
social groups) promotes the use of moral-based rather than
group-based conventional reasoning when children develop
their attitudes toward other social groups. One of the most
well-known approaches to reducing prejudice is the contact
hypothesis (Allport, 1954). In this hypothesis, contact means
individuals from one group (e.g., White British) meeting and
interacting with others from a different group (e.g., Afro-
Caribbean British). The underlying theory behind the contact
hypothesis is that prejudice is a consequence of unfamiliarity
with others from a different group, which results in negative
stereotyping of this group. Contact with others from another
group, under certain conditions, should expose individuals to
stereotype disconfirming information resulting in more posi-
tive attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors to this group.
Developmental researchers have recently shown that con-
tact between different social groups under certain conditions
reduces childhood prejudice (e.g., Feddes, Noack, & Rutland,
2009; McGlothlin & Killen, 2006; McGlothlin, Killen, &
Edmonds, 2005; Rutland, Cameron, Bennett, & Ferrell,
2005). For example, research has shown that, as children
acquire cross-race friendships, prejudice is reduced (Crystal
et al., 2008; McGlothlin & Killen, 2006) and adolescents are
able to reject stereotypic expectations about others (due to their
understanding that their friendship peers do not hold the nega-
tive qualities promoted in societal stereotypic images).
Intergroup contact is also known to reduce the use of
stereotypes to explain racial discomfort in interracial peer
interactions (Killen et al., in press). Recently, developmental
research using a measure of the wrongfulness of race-based
exclusion has shown that intergroup contact promotes moral
reasoning about social exclusion (Crystal et al., 2008). These
findings indicate that intergroup contact provides more than
just information—it encourages children to reject group-
based stereotypical reasoning in favor of moral reasoning that




















Figure 5. Mean racial prejudice under high or low public
accountability at different levels of social norm awareness
(Rutland, Cameron, Milne, & McGeorge, 2005; Study 1).
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friendship reducing prejudice has been supported by social psy-
chology research with adults (Page-Gould, Mendoza-Denton,
Alegre, & Siy, 2008; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). There is also
evidence that merely being aware of intergroup friendships
between members of one’s own group and another group can
also reduce prejudice (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, &
Ropp, 1997). This is known as the extended contact hypothesis.
There is evidence for this hypothesis in both adolescents (e.g.,
Turner, Voci, & Hewstone, 2007) and young children (e.g.,
Cameron et al., 2006).
In a series of studies, Cameron and colleagues developed
extended contact interventions for children as young as 5 years
old (see Cameron & Rutland, 2008). These interventions
exposed children to intergroup friendships through illustrated
story reading that portrayed friendships between ingroup and
outgroup members (e.g., White English children and non-
White refugee children). Cameron and colleagues found that
their extended contact intervention was effective in improving
children’s attitudes toward outgroups amongst children aged
5–11 and across a number of different stigmatized outgroups,
including the disabled (Cameron & Rutland, 2006), non-
White refugees (Cameron, Rutland, & Brown, 2007; Cameron
et al., 2006), and south Asian British (Cameron et al., 2007).
Outgroup Threat
Finally, recent research also supports our view that perceived
outgroup threats encourage children to base their exclusion
judgments more on group membership factors than on moral-
ity. Nesdale and colleagues (e.g., Nesdale, Durkin, Maass, &
Griffiths, 2005a) have shown that high perceived threat from
an ethnic outgroup promotes explicit ethnic prejudice. In their
research, they have shown that children are likely to react nega-
tively in defense of the ingroup with which they strongly iden-
tify if interethnic relations are conflictual and essentially
threatening to the ingroup (e.g., the outgroup wishes to deprive
the ingroup of resources or status). Nesdale and colleagues
typically manipulated outgroup threat in the Australian context
by making ingroup children believe that outgroup children
think they are better drawers than the ingroup in a picture draw-
ing competition and would like to win the competition. They
found that the Anglo-Australian young children turned their
ingroup bias into explicit ethnic prejudice toward the outgroup
(i.e., Pacific Islanders) when they thought the status of the
ingroup was threatened. In addition, they showed that children
with high ethnic ingroup identification were more likely to
express explicit dislike (i.e., prejudice) toward the ethnic out-
group (e.g., Nesdale, Durkin, Maass, & Griffith, 2005b). Other
research in contexts involving ‘‘hot’’ intergroup conflict and
high perceived outgroup threat, such as in Northern Ireland
(Cairns, 1989) and the Middle East (Bar-Tal & Teichman,
2005; Teichman, 2001), has also shown that ethnic prejudice
is often higher at a younger age (i.e., before 6 or 7 years old).
In summary, there is strong evidence to support our claim that
social norms, intergroup contact, and perceived outgroup threat
are important variables affecting the relative weight children
place on moral and group-based criteria in intergroup contexts.
Conclusion
Findings within developmental science show that children
develop moral principles of fairness and equality from an early
age, but they also develop implicit and explicit prejudice
toward others from different social groups. In this article, we
have argued these potential contradictory findings can be
reconciled through a new integrative social-cognitive develop-
mental approach to prejudice. This provides a more contextua-
lized analysis of prejudice development than that previously
offered by other developmental perspectives, such as those
espousing domain-general theories. We propose that this
framework provides a robust way of understanding how the
dynamic relationship between morality and group identity
forges children’s social reasoning attitudes. Moreover, we con-
tend that this dynamic exists in adult prejudice too and that
research with adults could advance further with a focus on this
dynamic.
The body of research described in this article argues against
the notion that children’s attitudes develop in a step-wise
domain-general (or ‘‘stage’’) manner. Our perspective argues
that a child’s attitudes can simultaneously reflect both group
and morality based concerns from an early age. We argue that
what determines the specific nature and emergence of prejudice
in childhood is reflected by a number of complex variables—
including the social context, relationships with others, and
social-cognitive development—that make particular conflic-
tual relationships between groups and group identities highly
salient or place an emphasis on the universal application of
moral principles of fairness and equality.
Whether (and when) children begin to show prejudice
depends on the close interplay between their emerging moral-
ity, their ability to understand group life, and their motivation
to act in accordance with certain group identities. This process
is extremely social-contextual and social-cognitive, involving
both developing social-cognitive abilities (e.g., advanced men-
tal state understanding, moral judgment, autonomy, and group
reasoning) and specific features of the intergroup context (e.g.,
strength and nature of the group identity, social norms, inter-
group contact, and perceived outgroup threat). Our perspective
argues that an understanding of this process is essential if we
are to identify key factors that can be used to limit or reduce
childhood prejudice. To date, psychological science has pro-
vided some answers by suggesting that reducing prejudice in
children can be accomplished through methods such as the pro-
motion of intergroup contact, inclusive common identities and
social norms, social-cognitive skills training, moral reasoning,
and tolerance (e.g., Aboud & Levy, 2000; Cameron & Rutland,
2008; Crystal et al., 2008).
We do not see childhood prejudice as inevitable, either due
to basic or instinctive perceptual cognitive processes or envi-
ronmental influences that are blindly followed by children.
Neither do we think prejudice is due to an inherent, innate flaw
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in a person’s moral character. Instead our perspective argues
that children and adults actively construct their attitudes using
their social-cognitive understanding to navigate between moral
principles and group identity concerns. Whether children’s
ingroup identity results in outgroup prejudice is determined
by a number of factors, including lack of high-quality inter-
group contact and a strong emphasis on exclusive group norms,
identity, and conventional reasoning.
Human history has shown that morality and prejudice often
exist side by side. For example, Thomas Jefferson, the principal
author of the American Declaration of Independence in 1776
wrote ‘‘ . . . all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their creator with certain unalienable rights that among these
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.’’ Yet Thomas
Jefferson owned many slaves throughout his lifetime. How was
this possible? Arguably, Thomas Jefferson’s group identity as
an American was critical here, as Black slaves to him were not
Americans and as such were a threat to the existence of the
embryonic American Republic escaping from the yoke of the
British Empire (Onuf, 2007). This situation seems unimagin-
able now that the United States of America has elected its first
president of African heritage, President Barack Obama, which
demonstrates to the world one way in which prejudice can be
overcome.
Nonetheless, much work remains to be done. As noted
above, Jefferson referred to ‘‘all men.’’ As has been well
documented, gender prejudice remains pervasive throughout
the world (Nussbaum, 2001). Further, research has shown that
intimate relationships may be the last context in which racial,
ethnic, and religious integration is accepted by the majority
of society (Kennedy, 2003). Although individuals may vote for
someone from a different ethnic background, which was unfor-
eseeable less than one generation ago, decisions about friend-
ship, dating, and marriage remained tied to ingroup identity
and are viewed outside the categories of fairness and justice.
Yet, the experiences of close intimate intergroup relationships
have been demonstrated to reflect the strongest predictor
of prejudice reduction in the intergroup contact literature
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Our hope is that our new SRD per-
spective fosters new integrative lines of research in psycholo-
gical science, which have the potential to create programs
and policy that move us closer to a more just and fair world.
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